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SUMMARY
This paper examines the vulnerability of labour markets to adverse 
economic shocks. We define labour market exposure as the cumulated 
amount of excess unemployment generated by a shock before 
unemployment returns to steady-state. We use a panel of 19 countries 
covering the period 1985–2010 to assess the influence of labour market 
policies on labour market exposure, which is also calcu-lated country by 
country. We find that less generous unemployment insurance, more active 
labour market policies or a lower minimum wage imply a trade-off between 
average unemployment and labour market exposure, as they help low-
skilled workers to get out of unemployment at the cost of increased 
vulnerability to adverse shocks. On the other hand, reducing the tax 
wedge is conducive to both lower steady-state unemployment and labour 
market exposure.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Five years after the trough from the Great Recession, the absence of a vigorous and
sustained recovery in many OECD countries has left a sizeable share of workers to
the margin of the labour market. For many of them – in particular youth and low-
skilled workers – the risk of developing weak attachment to the labour market is real,
with potentially adverse consequences on their career prospects. In this context, it is
legitimate to ask whether some labour market policies and institutions that may be
more conducive to low unemployment during ‘normal times’ may leave labour mar-
kets less well-equipped to cope with severe economic recessions, and therefore more
prone to entail large swings in employment along the business cycle. Put differently, is
there some evidence that policy settings that contribute to lower steady-state
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unemployment could lead to more persistent deviations from steady-state following
shocks?
Insofar as the short- and medium-term vulnerability of labour markets cannot be
neglected from a political point of view, this is a major source of concern for
policymakers. In particular, they may be more reluctant to undertake pro-employ-
ment labour market reforms if these come at the price of higher unemployment
volatility. Where trade-offs are identified, the ancillary question is the extent to which
these trade-offs could be eased through temporary changes in features or parameters
of specific policies that would strengthen their stabilizing properties (or weaken the
destabilizing ones), while still minimizing the potential adverse effects on steady-state
unemployment. Even though this would in principle lead to more optimal outcomes,
such structural policy fine-tuning may in practice be difficult to implement effectively.
In order to address these questions, it is first necessary to identify which type of
labour market policy settings appear more likely to favour lower trend unemployment
but at the cost of larger volatility (a policy trade-off), and which ones seem to improve
outcomes on both counts (a policy win-win). To that aim, we assess the relationship
between labour market policies and unemployment inflow and outflow rates (i.e. the
turnover rates). As there is a strong empirical link between the observed unemploy-
ment rate and the (steady-state) unemployment rate predicted by turnover rates, the
empirical relationships between policies and turnover rates depict fairly well unem-
ployment dynamics. Decomposing the unemployment rate into its turnover compon-
ents allows us to unveil the flow channels through which labour market policies can
affect short-term and long-term unemployment dynamics. Moreover, we also examine
how policies affect turnover dynamics, as we allow for an effect of policies not only on
the average level of turnover rates, but also on their degree of time persistence and on
their sensitivity to economic shocks.
In a second step, we define and calculate labour market exposure as the average
percentage deviation of unemployment from the long-term level following an adverse
shock. Interestingly, labour market exposure is found to differ quite substantially
across various labour market policy settings. Indeed, we find that less generous unem-
ployment insurance, more active labour market policies and a lower minimum wage
imply larger labour market exposure. In all three cases, this can be explained by an
increase in the proportion of low-skilled workers in employment whose lower produc-
tivity makes them more vulnerable to economic downturns. No such trade-off is
uncovered with other policies. We find that a higher tax wedge increases both the
steady-state level and volatility of unemployment and, therefore labour market expos-
ure. Reducing the tax wedge constitutes in this regard a ‘win-win’ strategy. The other
policies examined in the paper have no substantial effects on the level and/or the
volatility of unemployment.
The analysis in the paper is grounded in the Mortensen–Pissarides (1994) model
and its particular version presented in Jung and Kuhn (2013), as well as in the
Murtin and Robin (2013) extension of Robin (2011). However, the paper also relates
to past studies focusing on unemployment dynamics (see Blanchard, 2006, for a
comprehensive survey). Starting from the classical wage and price-setting model that
highlights real and nominal wage rigidities (Layard et al., 1991; Bruno and Sachs,
1985), a large empirical literature has assessed the unemployment effects of unem-
ployment insurance and employment protection systems (Nickell, 1990, 1998;
Machin and Manning, 1999; Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007; Bentolila et al., 2010), wage
bargaining institutions (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988), product market regulation
(Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003; Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2005; Fiori et al., 2007;
Griffith et al., 2007), as well as the interaction between these institutional variables or
with economic shocks (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Bassanini and Duval, 2009;
Abbritti and Weber, 2010). We believe that this paper is the first one to examine
empirically the relationships between labour market institutions and unemployment
turnover dynamics.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic relationship
between unemployment stock and turnover, and describe the data as well as stylized
facts. Section 3 first examines the theoretical and empirical relationships between
labour market policies and unemployment turnover. It then defines and computes
labour market exposure to adverse shocks under different policy settings. Section 4
provides estimates of the variation in steady-state unemployment after policy reforms
and examines the potential existence of trade-offs between the level and volatility of
unemployment. The last section concludes.
2. DATA AND STYLIZED FACTS
This section sheds light on the relationships between unemployment turnover and the
rate of unemployment, and describes the data and stylized facts. In this study, the
sample is composed of annual data covering 19 OECD countries1 over the period
1985 to 2010.
2.1. The relationship between unemployment and unemployment turnover
The evolution of unemployment over time is conveniently described by a two-state
model (employment-unemployment) that ignores inactivity and considers a fixed
labour force.2 Between two periods, the change in unemployment is simply equal to
the number of workers being laid off and falling into unemployment minus the
number of unemployed workers finding a job. Formally, one has:
1 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Neth-
erlands, Norway, New-Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States.
2 Taking into account inactivity would result in a three-states model (employment-unemployment-inactiv-
ity) as developed for instance by Blanchard and Diamond (1989), Burda and Wyplosz (1994) or Ponomar-
eva and Sheen (2009). In this case, six series of transition rates would be involved instead of two, and these
series are not available for a panel of OECD countries.
utþ1  ut ¼ st et  ft ut ¼ stð1 utÞ  ft ut ð1Þ
where ut denotes the rate of unemployment, et the employment rate as a share of the
labour force, st the unemployment inflow rate and ft the unemployment outflow rate.
The two latter variables are labelled as ‘unemployment turnover rates’.
Let us now define steady-state unemployment. Unemployment is constant at
steady-state, implying that there is an equal number of people entering or exiting
unemployment. Using the above expression, steady-state unemployment can be
expressed as:
ut ¼
st
st þ ft ð2Þ
Notice that steady-state unemployment changes over time, as unemployment inflow
and outflow rates are not constant in general. Steady-state unemployment is therefore
more precisely defined as the equilibrium value that unemployment would perman-
ently reach, were inflow and outflow rates to remain constant.
Then, the observed unemployment rate can be related to unemployment turnover
rates in a simple way: One simply assumes that steady-state unemployment can be
used as a proxy for the observed unemployment rate as they are empirically not very
different, so that:
ut  ut ð3Þ
This approximation appears to be valid for all countries at all times, with the
exception of Spain and Ireland during periods of very high unemployment (from the
mid-1980s until the mid-1990s). The two variables are plotted against each other on
Figure 1. There is a 0.972 cross-country and cross-time correlation between observed
and steady-state unemployment.
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Figure 1. An approximation of the observed unemployment rate
Econometric analysis further reveals that steady-state unemployment is a linear
transformation of actual unemployment with slope coefficient 1.03 and intercept
0.96. Hence, cross-country differences in actual unemployment are almost perfectly
reflected by cross-country differences in steady-state unemployment, but one has to
bear in mind that steady-state unemployment is on average about one percentage
point lower than its observed counterpart. For instance, average steady-state unem-
ployment is calculated at 9.8% in France between 1985 and 2010, while average
unemployment equals 10.2%. The difference between steady-state and actual
unemployment rates could be further explained by the way unemployment turnover
rates are calculated (see below).
It follows that the relationship between the actual rate of unemployment and turn-
over rates can be approximated in the following way:3
ut  st
st þ ft ð4Þ
2.2. How does the unemployment turnover look like across OECD countries?
Our measures of unemployment inflows and outflows are derived mainly from the
OECD’s Unemployment Distribution Database. This dataset provides information
on the incidence of unemployment by duration: less than one month, 1 to 3 months, 3
to 6 months, 6 to 12 and over 12 months. The fraction of the labour force un-
employed for less than m months is denoted by u<m. The monthly inflow and outflow
rates are calculated as proposed by Shimer (2012). In a first step, one computes the
monthly probability of exiting unemployment, simply as equal to the stock of unem-
ployed people observed during the following month, minus the number of people who
have entered unemployment during the month, divided by the stock of unemployed
people at the beginning of the month. In a second-step, one calculates the continuous-
time equivalent outflow rate f1 based on duration statistics, which is simply measured
as:
f 1 ¼  log utþ1  u
\1
tþ1
ut
 
ð5Þ
Similar continuous-time series can be obtained on the basis of unemployment dura-
tion statistics using a quarterly time span.4 Following Shimer (2012) and Elsby et al.
(2013a), the monthly inflow rate s1 is then calculated from Equation (1) solved forward
3 Elsby et al. (2013) add a second-order term to this decomposition, which is neglected here. From an
empirical perspective, Shimer (2012) shows that ‘the job finding probability has accounted for three-quar-
ters of the fluctuations in the unemployment rate in the United States and the employment exit probability
for one-quarter’.
4 In this case f 3 ¼  1
3
log
utþ3u\3tþ3
ut
 
.
by 12 months under the assumption that the monthly employment-exit and job-find-
ing rates are constant within years. To lower the time aggregation bias (Elsby et al.,
2013a), we select monthly-based series for countries in which the outflow rate is found
to decrease over time, and quarterly-based series for other countries. The existence of
negative duration dependence, namely the decline in the outflow rate along the unem-
ployment spell, may potentially yield an overestimation of the outflow rate, and the
underestimation of the steady-state unemployment rate by one percentage point, as
noted above. The resulting dataset is complemented by other sources, including Mur-
tin et al. (2014), Murtin and Robin (2013), and is composed of 19 OECD countries for
the period 1985–2010. In many ways, it is consistent with the data used in Elsby et al.
(2013a), but covers more countries.
Table 1 reports the average unemployment and turnover for all countries over the
period, while Figure 2 provides a scatter diagram of the average unemployment
inflow and outflow rates by country. It can be seen: (1) that the average flow variables
are strongly and positively correlated; and (2) that average worker flows are much
larger in most English-speaking and Nordic countries than in other countries.5,6
Moreover we reported on this graph the iso-curves of steady-state unemployment,
namely the values of inflow and outflow rates for which a similar steady-state unem-
ployment rate is obtained. These lines reveal an interesting feature: labour markets
characterized by similar rates of unemployment can hide very different underlying
turnover dynamics. For instance, the Netherlands, Austria and Japan display more or
less the same rate of (steady-state) unemployment as Norway or the United States, but
the labour markets of the latter two countries witness far more turnover.
2.3. Labour market institutions
The database on unemployment turnover is complemented by a set of labour market
policy and institutional variables. These series include: the initial (first-year) replace-
ment rate of unemployment benefits; the average duration of unemployment benefits
proxied by the ratio of the average (over five years) to initial replacement rates; the
OECD index of employment protection for regular contracts;7 the volume of active
5 Moreover, there is generally a positive association between the coefficients of variation of the inflow and
outflow rates. Among high-turnover countries, Nordic countries display much more volatility in unem-
ployment turnover than English-speaking countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the
United States.
6 A closer look at the variation in inflow and outflow over time reveals diverging trends. In some countries
such as Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, the United Kingdom and Spain, there has been a clear upward
trend in outflow rates. Conversely, there seems to have been a downward trend in outflow rates in
Belgium, Japan and Portugal since the early 1990s. In the US we retained the variable from Robin (2011),
who does not apply any correction to the raw series to account for a break in the CPS around 1993 as
Shimer (2012) and Elsby et al. (2013). As a result, one still observes a downward trend after 1993.
7 The analysis of dual labour market and the effect of employment protection for temporary contracts on
unemployment goes beyond the scope of this paper.
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labour market policies per unemployed worker normalized by GDP per worker,8 and
its three main sub-components (public employment services denoted as PES, employ-
ment incentives and training); the tax wedge;9 the OECD index of product market
regulation; the share of workers that are members of a union (union density); the min-
imum wage as a share of the median wage.10
Table 1 summarizes the country averages of each institution over the period. To
some extent, countries can be broadly classified according to the emphasis put on pro-
tecting employment or on providing support to the unemployed through active and
passive labour market policies.
• Nordic countries combine generous unemployment benefits with strong activation
measures (supported by intensive job-search assistance and training possibilities).
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Figure 2. Average inflow and outflow rates
8 In order to remove cyclical variations in ALMPs that result from cyclical unemployment variations, we
apply a HP filter to the constructed series and use only the trend series in subsequent regressions. This pro-
cedure corrects for the endogeneity that arises from the fact that ALMP spending has traditionally been
relatively insensitive to cyclical changes in the unemployment rate (OECD, 2009). It does not address the
endogeneity problem that may arise when the variation in ALMP spending falls short of the variation in
the structural rate of unemployment. This may be less of a problem since ALMP spending has traditionally
been more responsive to changes in the structural unemployment rate. If ALMP spending nevertheless
falls short of the variation in structural unemployment, this will bias the estimated impact of ALMP spend-
ing on unemployment downward.
9 The OECD tax wedge is a summary index of labour and personal income taxes. It was preferred to a
simple labour tax index as the latter series is affected by a break in the late 1990s. However, our main
results are largely unaffected if we replace the tax wedge by labour taxes.
10 We impute an average minimum wage for countries that do not display any official minimum wage
and systematically introduce a dummy taking value 1 for the latter set of countries in the econometric
analysis. Hence the coefficient on the minimum wage pertains to the set of countries displaying a min-
imum wage.
Among these countries, Sweden also provides relatively strong job protection for
employees on regular contract.
• A majority of Continental European countries combine strict employment protec-
tion with fairly generous support to the unemployed, mainly in the form of passive
measures such as high unemployment income replacement rates. Many of them
have strengthened active labour market policies during the 2000s.
• English-speaking countries generally combine weak employment protection with
low to moderate income support for the unemployed. These countries typically
put very little emphasis on active labour market policies.
3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LABOUR MARKET POLICIES AND
UNEMPLOYMENT TURNOVER
In this section, we explore the theoretical and empirical relationships between labour
market policies and unemployment turnover series. We first compare the predictions
of two different theoretical set-ups regarding the effect of labour market reforms on
unemployment level and volatility, and then we lay out the econometric framework.
3.1. Theoretical Underpinnings
Labour economists have used the job search model developed by Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994, henceforth MP) as a workhorse to understand unemployment
dynamics. While Shimer (2005) has shown that the initial MP model was unable to
account for unemployment volatility given the small magnitude of productivity shocks,
several extensions of the MP model have been proposed to solve the ‘unemployment
volatility puzzle’. For instance, Hall (2005) relied on wage rigidities, Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008) calibrated a very high value of non-market time while Pissarides
(2009) introduced fixed matching costs. Moreover, other job search models using
different wage formation set-ups, such as the one proposed by Robin (2011), have
successfully captured unemployment dynamics.
Cross-country differences in labour market policies and institutions have logically
been viewed as prime candidates to explain the cross-country variations in unemploy-
ment and unemployment turnover dynamics. Using the modified MP framework
developed by den Haan et al. (2000), Jung and Kuhn (2013, henceforth JK) explain
the differences in the average and the volatility of worker flows between Germany and
the United States mainly from differences in matching efficiency. As another example,
Murtin and Robin (2013, henceforth MR) fit the dynamics of unemployment, unem-
ployment inflow and outflows as well as labour market tightness in nine OECD coun-
tries, and find that labour market reforms are as important as business cycle shocks to
explain the dynamics of the latter variables (see Box 1).
Box 1. Labour market policies in job search theory
Following Mortensen and Pissarides’ (1994) seminal contribution, a number of
papers have sought to integrate labour market policies into a job search model.
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008) highlight the interaction between unemployment
insurance and more frequent reallocation shocks, while Prescott (2004) and Roger-
son (2007) emphasize the role of labour taxes. Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) study
the effects of employment protection on unemployment and its turnover, while
Felbermayr and Pratt (2011) analyse the effects of product market regulation.
A stylized Mortensen-Pissarides model is helpful to identify the key parameters
through which labour market policies may affect unemployment. Assume that
firms pay employed workers a wage w and receive y, where y is the productivity of
the match. Firms post vacancies v at a cost c until ex ante profits from filling a job
are exhausted. Unemployed workers receive a flow payment z and search for a
job. The meeting rate between job seekers and firms posting vacancies follows a
Cobb–Douglas technology, so that the probability for the unemployed to find a
job and exit unemployment is simply f = /(v/u)g and the probability for an
employer to fill a vacancy is q = f.u/v. The number of posted vacancies is deter-
mined by the ‘free-entry condition’ stating that firms’ ex ante profits are null or
 c + q.V = 0 where V is firms’ surplus in case a vacancy is filled. Total surplus is
the sum of the match’ surplus, namely y – w, and employment’ surplus, namely w
– z, and is therefore equal to y – z. Assuming repeated Nash bargaining over total
surplus between firms and employers, firms’ surplus is simply V = b(y  z) where
b stands for their bargaining power. A few algebraic manipulations yield the fol-
lowing expression for the outflow rate f = /(/b(y  z)/c)g. Recalling than unem-
ployment is given by u = s/(s + f), there appear to be several channels through
which labour market policies may affect unemployment: matching efficiency /,
the value of non-market time z, the cost of posting vacancies c, workers bargaining
power b. In addition, some models (e.g. Den Haan et al., 2000; Cahuc and Postel-
Vinay, 2002) introduce a firing tax s.
Murtin and Robin (2013) is to the best of our knowledge the first study looking
at the effects of a large number of labour market policies on both the level and the
cyclical dynamics of unemployment. They use Robin’s (2011) seminal model
based on endogenous job destruction. Workers differ according to their ability and
yield different profits to firms when employed. In a downturn, the surplus gener-
ated by low-skill workers eventually becomes negative and they are automatically
laid off. If the distribution of ability displays some thickness at its left tail, a small
productivity shock is able to generate a lot of job destruction. This simple ampli-
fication mechanism provides an explanation to the ‘unemployment volatility
puzzle’ (Shimer, 2005; Pissarides, 2009).
Their framework is complemented by the introduction of policy reforms that
change the structure of the labour market. In practice, key parameters governing
the dynamics of unemployment and turnover depend on a set of labour market
policies. These structural parameters are the rate of exogenous job destruction (s),
matching efficiency (/) and the cost of posting vacancies c. In practice, they allow
the replacement rate and ALMPs to determine job destruction and matching effi-
ciency, with the view that these institutions determine the degree of job search
intensity and eventually the quality of the matching between employers and
employees. Then, they allow the tax wedge and product market regulation to
determine job creation through the cost of posting vacancies, as well as the exogen-
ous job destruction rate. The model is estimated for nine OECD countries between
1985 and 2007.
Overall, their structural model explains about two-thirds of the variance of
unemployment, unemployment inflows and outflows and labour market tightness,
with labour market reforms accounting for one-third and business cycle shocks for
another third. The most effective labour market policy reforms, in terms of redu-
cing steady-state unemployment, are found to be active labour market policies and
product market regulation. These results are in line with those described in this
study.
Table 2 reviews how labour market institutions may affect unemployment turnover
dynamics according to job search theory. We consider five different channels: match-
ing efficiency, the value of non-market time, the cost of posting a vacancy, the size of
the firing tax and worker’s bargaining power. The first three channels are common
parameters to JK and MR frameworks. Table 2 reports the changes in the average
and the volatility of the inflow and outflow rates following an increase in each of the
latter structural parameters.
In each case, we compare JK’s theoretical results with simulation outcomes
drawn from the MR model,11 thus considering two distinct job search apparatus.
Strikingly, JK theoretical results and MR simulations are fully consistent with each
other regarding average flows, but have different implications about flows volatil-
ity. Indeed, the two frameworks predict an opposite change in inflow volatility
when matching efficiency or the cost of posting a vacancy are increased. Under
the same circumstances, JK’s simple framework does not imply any change in the
11 We use Tables 3 and 4 in JK. The JK measure of turnover rate’s volatility is the percentage deviation
from steady-state caused by a productivity shock. Using a first-order approximation, the latter measure
coincides in absolute value with the coefficient of variation of the turnover rate (assuming without loss of
generality a standard deviation of the productivity shock equal to one). In MR simulations, the volatility
measure is similarly the coefficient of variation of the turnover rate.
volatility of the outflow rate, while MR simulations imply small but non-zero
changes.
The fact that the two models behave differently regarding inflow volatility is
explained by the existence of workers’ heterogeneity in the MR framework. In the
latter model, higher matching efficiency translates into a higher share of employed
Table 2. Turnover dynamics in job search theory
Inflow rate Outflow rate
Mean CV Mean CV
Φmatching efficiency
JK theory +  + 0
MR simulations + + ++ +
z value of non-market time
JK theory + +  +
MR simulations + +  ++
c cost of posting a vacancy
JK theory  +  0
MR simulations    
s firing tax
JK theory  +  +
l worker bargaining power
JK theory + (US)  (US)  0
 (EU) + (EU)
Note: This Table reports the sign of the change in the average and in the coefficient of variation of unemploy-
ment flows following an increase in the various structural parameters of the models. ‘+/’ denote respectively an
increase/decrease in turnover’s mean or volatility. JK uses the Mortensen–Pissarides framework augmented for
labour market institutions as described by den Haan–Ramey–Watson (2000). MR consists of a slight extension of
Robin (2011). In MR simulations, the changes in structural parameters are calibrated to yield a similar absolute
variation in steady-state unemployment. The largest effects observed on turnover’s mean and coefficient of varia-
tion are denoted as ‘++’ and ‘’.
Table 3. Labour market institutions and turnover dynamics 1985–2010
Inflow rate Outflow rate
Mean CV Mean CV
Initial net replacement rate  
Average benefits duration 
Active ALMP + +
Tax wedge + + +
Existence of minimum wage  +
Generosity of minimum wage + 
Employment protection (regular contracts) +
Product market regulation  +
Union density 
low-skill workers who generate low profits and are therefore under the threat of
being laid off if economic conditions deteriorate. In other words, higher matching
efficiency yields a higher inflow volatility due to a composition effect among employed
workers. In the MP model, workers are identical and inflow volatility is inversely
proportional to the outflow rate, which increases with matching efficiency (see JK,
Table 3).
The mechanisms for which MP and MR provide consistent results can be briefly
discussed. A higher matching efficiency yields a higher outflow rate, but from the
‘free-entry condition’ describing the labour market equilibrium, it also implies a
lower firm’s surplus, and hence a higher inflow rate. Besides, a higher value of
non-market time has a large negative impact on total surplus and firm’s surplus in
particular, driving the outflow rate down and the inflow rate up and making them
more sensitive to economic fluctuations. A higher cost of posting vacancies
depresses job creation and the outflow rate but it also raises the surplus of a filled
vacancy and hence reduces the inflow rate. A higher firing tax primarily lowers the
inflow rate but also expected firm’s surplus in equilibrium, lowering thereby the
number of posted vacancies and the outflow rate, and making job positions more
sensitive to fluctuations in economic conditions. Finally, a stronger worker’s bar-
gaining power reduces firm’s surplus and job creation, and it has ambiguous effects
on the inflow rate (see discussion in JK).
3.2. Econometric framework
The latter results derived from two distinct job search theories are helpful to examine
the estimates drawn from reduced-form regressions applied to panel data. More
Table 4. Labour market exposure versus steady-state unemployment
Labour Market Exposure Steady-state Unemployment
All coefficients
Only significant
coefficients All coefficients
Only significant
coefficients
Benchmark 5.6 5.6 7.7 7.7
In variation relative to benchmark value
Initial replacement rate 1.54 1.44 1.58 1.35
Average benefits duration 0.62 0.25 0.48 0.00
ALMPs 2.34 2.14 1.14 1.12
Tax wedge 4.65 5.13 0.07 1.75
Existence of minimum wage 3.02 3.02 0.09 0.00
Generosity of minimum wage 1.13 1.45 1.97 2.26
PMR 0.24 0.21 0.71 1.17
EPL regular 0.25 0.31 0.42 0.00
Union density 0.44 0.31 4.55 0.00
precisely, we model the dynamics of the turnover rate x (be it the inflow or the outflow
rate) as follows:
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where X stands for labour market policy and institutional variables and Z for a meas-
ure of business cycle conditions. In the above framework, labour market policies affect
the long-term level x* of turnover rates through parameters b, the persistence of turn-
over through parameters q and their sensitivity to business cycle shocks through
parameters /. As regards unemployment, the steady-state unemployment rate is
determined by the (difference between) labour market coefficients (bs, b f ), and simi-
larly for unemployment sensitivity parameters /. Regarding persistence parameters,
any policy increasing either inflow or outflow persistence coefficients (qs, q f ) is
deemed to increase unemployment persistence.12
Our measure of business cycle shocks Z is the output gap constructed by the
OECD. While it could be argued that the output gap contains some endogenous com-
ponents resulting from a lower degree of labour utilization, we did not find lagged
unemployment to be a negative and significant determinant of the output gap once its
lagged level is controlled for. Moreover, many economic studies use a (Hodrick–
Prescott filtered) output gap as an input to unemployment dynamics (e.g. Bassanini
and Duval, 2009). Therefore, while we account for the fact that the output gap Z is
correlated across time, we assume that its degree of persistence is independent from
policy variables.13
Finally, policy variables are assumed to be strictly exogenous. The relaxation of the
latter assumption and the instrumentation of current policies by their lagged levels in
a GMM-type framework (assuming weak exogeneity) destroys the significance of all
coefficients from the gap channel possibly due to weak instrumentation (i.e. coeffi-
cients /), while leaving the others mostly unchanged.
The estimates are described in the Appendix, while Table 3 reports the results in a
qualitative way to ease the comparison with Table 2. In practice, we raise each labour
12 In the wake of an adverse economic shock, any policy that increases inflow or outflow persistence main-
tains the inflow (respectively the outflow) above (resp. below) its steady-state, hence increasing unemploy-
ment persistence as well.
13 In practice, it is very hard to disentangle policy effects on the output gap and those influencing the
transmission of the output gap to unemployment turnover rates.
market policy by one standard deviation and we calculate the resulting changes in the
average turnover rates and in their coefficient of variation.14 The sign of the change
in the average and volatility is reported below.
To a large extent, the above empirical results are consistent with theoretical priors
described by Table 2. First, a higher tax wedge is associated with a higher net value
of non-market time, which can explain the larger inflow rate and the increased volatil-
ity of turnover rates on Table 3. Second, a higher net replacement rate and a longer
duration of unemployment benefits could also be associated with a higher value of
non-market time, which in principle should entail increased inflow rates and turnover
volatility. However, they also lead to less intense job search by the unemployed, hence
a lower degree of matching efficiency, which pulls down the outflow rate (in both MP
and MR models) and turnover volatility (in MR model). While the empirical results
would suggest that the latter effect dominates the non-market activity channel, the
lower volatility of inflows and outflows suggested from Table 3 could also arise from
demand-side factors not captured in the model, in particular the automatic stabilizing
role that unemployment benefits can play.
Similarly, the existence and generosity of the minimum wage may increase the
value of non-market time, as suggested by the larger average inflow rate and the
higher outflow volatility. However, the lower inflow volatility depicted on Table 3
suggests that the minimum wage may also influence turnover through other channels
such as (lower) matching efficiency, or demand-side effects insofar as a higher min-
imum wage may cushion the impact of negative productivity shocks and reduce inflow
volatility.
A tighter employment protection is linked to a larger firing tax, which explains why
the volatility of the inflow rate goes up on Table 3. Similarly, stringent product mar-
ket regulation partly reflects the deeper involvement of the government in economic
life as in France (see Table 1) and an associated larger firing cost; the latter is consist-
ent with a lower outflow rate and a higher outflow volatility in the empirical estimates
(Table 3).
Finally, a larger union density reduces inflow volatility (Table 3), which in theory is
possible when workers’ bargaining power is already relatively low (Table 2).
4. IS THERE A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN LABOUR MARKET EXPOSURE AND
STEADY-STATE UNEMPLOYMENT?
In this section we first define and calculate the exposure of labour markets to adverse
economic shocks. In a second step, we calculate the variation in steady-state unem-
ployment after policy reforms and examine the potential existence of trade-offs
between labour market exposure and steady-state unemployment among OECD
14 Assuming log-normal distributions, the coefficient of variation of turnover rates is given by the first-
order approximation CV  rðXÞð1qðXÞ2Þ1=2
countries. To that aim, we use the statistical model (7) depicted in Table 3 and the
Appendix.
4.1. Assessing labour market exposure to economic shock
4.1.1. Defining labour market exposure. We define labour market exposure to
adverse shocks as the average percentage deviation of (steady-state)15 unemployment
from its long-term level following an adverse shock. It is calculated as the cumulated
amount of unemployment in excess of the initial unemployment level, divided by the
initial unemployment rate and the duration of the transition period during which
unemployment returns to equilibrium.
Our proposed definition is best illustrated on Figure 3, which depicts the evolution
of (steady-state) unemployment while assuming an average value of labour market pol-
icies. At the initial period, a one standard-deviation adverse shock is hitting the labour
market previously at equilibrium (i.e. zero output gap). This corresponds to a sudden
trough in the output gap that gradually returns to zero. Because of labour market slug-
gishness, the unemployment rate does not adjust immediately to economic conditions.
Actually, it takes four years to reach its maximum level (+1.3 percentage points) on
the figure below, and another 6 years to close half of the way back to equilibrium,
which is identical to the initial unemployment level as there is no policy change in this
simulation. After 30 years, unemployment has completely returned to initial value.
More specifically, labour market exposure is defined as the average relative increase
in unemployment over the reference 30-year time span. In practice, it is calculated as
the cumulated amount of cyclical unemployment (i.e. the area under the curve)
divided by the initial (or final) level of (steady-state) unemployment and divided by 30.
In Figure 3, initial unemployment is at 7.7% and labour market exposure is equal to
5.6%, meaning that the adverse shock has increased unemployment by an average
5.6 9 7.7 / 100 = 0.4 percentage points over the 30-year time span.
Defined as such, labour market exposure appears to be a relative rather than abso-
lute concept of ‘unemployment at risk’, in the sense that it captures the relative rather
than absolute deviation in unemployment over time. This is justified by the log-linear
relationship between unemployment and labour market policies, which trigger a
multiplicative rather than additive effect upon unemployment. Moreover, looking at
relative deviation as a volatility concept is the usual standpoint in the literature
(see above). However, the final section will illustrate how our findings are modified
when using an absolute concept of labour market exposure.
4.1.2. The impact of labour market policies on labour market exposure. In
a second step, we redo the former simulation under different labour market policy
15 ‘Steady-state unemployment’ is used here in the sense of ‘flow-consistent unemployment rate’ rather
than ‘long-term equilibrium unemployment rate’.
settings. We consider an identical adverse shock across simulations, add one standard
deviation to each policy separately and compare the resulting measures of labour
market exposure. As policies differ across simulations, initial and final steady-state
unemployment would normally differ across simulations everything else equal. To
obtain the same starting values of inflows, outflows and unemployment, we do not
change the value of policies in the level component, and simply allow persistence and
sensitivity effects to be at play. The level effect will be examined subsequently.
To simulate the evolution of inflows, outflows and steady-state unemployment fol-
lowing a shock, one needs to choose a predictor, namely a statistical model. We exam-
ine two predictors. In a conservative approach, we restrict to zero the non-significant
(at a 10% confidence level) coefficients of policies depicted in Table A1.16 Altern-
atively, we let the data speak and keep all significant and non-significant coefficients
described in Table A1, using thereby a fully unconstrained model. The latter model
has pros and cons. It makes use of all available information and accounts for coeffi-
cients that were almost significant at a 10% confidence level; on the other hand, some
calculated effects may rely on non-significant underlying coefficients, which may cast
doubts on the calculated labour market exposure. Figure 4 describes the results
obtained from the simulation with unconstrained coefficients. We also plot the bench-
mark with no policy change. First, four policies or institutions, namely union density,
the duration of unemployment benefits, employment protection and product market
regulation generate little change vis-a-vis the benchmark. These policies are therefore
almost neutral in terms of labour market exposure.
Second, labour market exposure to the adverse shock largely differs across policy
settings. A larger tax wedge or volume of ALMPs are associated with a larger
Figure 3. Unemployment dynamics in an average OECD country 1985–2010
16 In this case, the constants are adjusted so as to start from the same values of inflows and outflows.
exposure to adverse shocks. Conversely, a more generous minimum wage or replace-
ment rate, and the existence of a minimum wage per se are conducive to smaller expos-
ures. The effect of the minimum wage is explained by the lower volatility of the inflow
rate, while the replacement rate affects the volatility of the outflow rate as shown on
Table 2.
Notice that policies associated with a larger short-term exposure, as measured by
the peak of unemployment observed within the first five years after the shock, also
increase long-term exposure as defined by steady-state unemployment levels after,
say, fifteen years. In other words, there does not appear to be diverging results across
shorter or longer time horizons.
The first part of Table 4 summarizes the above findings on labour market exposure
and examines whether they are robust to the choice of a more conservative model
where only significant coefficients would be taken into consideration. Apart from the
effect of unemployment benefits duration that does not display a consistent sign across
the two specifications, all results are only marginally modified and can therefore be
viewed as highly robust.
4.2. The impact of labour market policies on steady-state unemployment
As before, we consider a country endowed with average labour market policy settings
initially at steady-state. Then, we increase each labour market policy separately by
one standard deviation and calculate the new steady-state unemployment after a
large number of periods have elapsed. As in the former section, we test two predic-
tors, one with unconstrained coefficients and another with non-significant coefficients
set to 0.
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Figure 4. Labour market exposure under various institutional settings
The second part of Table 4 reports the resulting variation in steady-state unem-
ployment corresponding to each policy reform. As expected, increases in the replace-
ment rate, the generosity of the minimum wage and the strictness of product market
regulation are conducive to higher unemployment, while higher spending on ALMPs
drives unemployment down. The effects of benefits duration, employment protection
and union density are not robust to the choice of a more conservative predicting
model (column 4) in contrast to the tax wedge, which recovers a positive and large
effect. The introduction per se of a minimum wage is found to have no effect.
For each policy reform, Figure 5 displays the associated variation in labour market
exposure relative to the benchmark as calculated in the previous section, with respect
to the variation in steady-state unemployment described above. For this figure, the
most conservative predicting model was selected (Table 4, columns 2 and 4). This
graph illustrates in a simple and intuitive way whether some labour market reforms
are associated with lower unemployment at the expense of higher vulnerability to
economic shocks, our key economic policy issue.
Of the policy variables included in the analysis, three point to a potential trade-off
between reducing the volatility of unemployment following an adverse shock and
achieving low steady-state unemployment: unemployment benefits, the minimum
wage and active labour market policies. The first two are found to lower unemploy-
ment persistence but at the expense of a higher long-term level. Active labour market
policies have the opposite effect, that is, to lower steady-state unemployment, via a
permanently increased outflow rate, but at the cost of raising persistence. Only one
policy variable, the tax wedge, leads to a clear complementarity between the steady-
state level and volatility of unemployment.
The generosity of unemployment benefits exerts an influence on steady-state unem-
ployment by raising reservation wages, hence increasing the value of non-market
activities. It also reduces job-search intensity and the efficiency of matching. The
results reported above (Table 3 and Table A1) corroborate earlier evidence that more
generous unemployment benefits raise unemployment by lowering the outflow rate.17
Insofar as a higher net replacement rate increases the value of non-market activity, it
should also raise volatility according to model predictions discussed in Section 3. We
mainly attributed the negative effect of more generous benefits on unemployment per-
sistence to the domination of another offsetting channel, namely the reduction in
matching efficiency induced by weakened job search incentives. However, other
factors not directly captured by the model could explain the reduced volatility. For
instance, income support could play the role of automatic stabilizer, as higher replace-
ment rates help to mitigate the propagation of adverse shocks by limiting their impact
on aggregate demand.
17 The results from Table 3 show that only the net replacement rate effect could be found as significant.
Earlier evidence has shown that benefit duration has a stronger impact on the length of unemployment
spells than the reduction in replacement rates (Lalive et al., 2005)
Active labour market policies are found to reduce steady-state unemployment but
at a relatively high cost. For instance, taking the above results at face value, an
increase in spending of around 0.4 percentage points of GDP would be required to
reduce steady-state unemployment by one percentage point (Table 4, column 4).
Moreover, active labour market policies may foster unemployment volatility by bring-
ing low-skill unemployed workers back into employment, but in precarious job
positions.
The third policy trade-off concerns the generosity of the minimum wage, which
may result in permanently higher steady-state unemployment but lower volatility due
to stabilizing demand effects during an economic downturn. Note also that the effect
of the minimum wage on unemployment dynamics is presumably conditional on the
magnitude of other institutional variables such as the amount of payroll taxes. For the
sake of simplicity, interactions between policies have been ignored in this framework.
Finally, the results reported above illustrate the potential for reduction in the tax
wedge to lower both the long-term level and volatility of unemployment in response
to shocks. For instance, a reduction of around 6 percentage points in the labour tax
wedge could on average induce a decline of one percentage point in unemployment
(Table 4, column 4).
4.3. Labour market exposure and steady-state unemployment among OECD
countries
Let us now examine how OECD countries fare both in terms of labour market expos-
ure and steady-state unemployment. To that end, we replicate the two latter simula-
tions at the country level. First, we calculate steady-state unemployment for each
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Figure 5. Labour market exposure versus steady-state unemployment
Note: Calculations are based on the statistical model with only significant coefficients as given by Table A1.
country by setting the output gap to zero and by setting each policy and institution at
its country-specific average over the period. Figure 6 compares the predicted steady-
state unemployment to the average observed one. The correlation is very high so that
our constructed steady-states appear to be credible.
Second, we impose on each country a common adverse shock that gradually
returns to zero and calculate the implied labour market exposure. As above, each pol-
icy is set at its country-specific average. Notice that each country displays its specific
steady-state unemployment level, which does not mechanically inflate or reduce our
measure of labour market exposure, as the latter is a relative measure normalized by
the steady-state unemployment level.
Figure 7 situates OECD countries in the dual space of labour market exposure and
steady-state unemployment. Strikingly, there does not appear to be any cross-country
correlation between labour market exposure and steady-state unemployment.
Countries with high labour market exposure and high steady-state unemployment
are Spain, France and Belgium. Conversely, countries with relatively lower steady-
state unemployment level and volatility include some English-speaking countries such
as Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom and New Zealand, but also
Denmark, typically associated with a ‘flexicurity’ model of labour market. The lowest
labour market exposure is observed in Finland, whose steady-state unemployment is
just equal to the average of the sample.
The conclusions are barely modified when one looks at an absolute measure of
labour market exposure, defined as the absolute deviation from steady-state unem-
ployment over a 30-year time span (Figure 8). As unemployment reacts in a multiplic-
ative way to changes in labour market policies, one observes now a positive
correlation of 0.61 between steady-state unemployment and absolute labour market
Figure 6. Predicted versus observed average steady-state unemployment
exposure. The ranking of countries is marginally modified, as Norway joins the group
of countries with low unemployment level and exposure to shocks.
6. CONCLUSION
The contrasting labour market performance across countries during the Great Reces-
sion and subsequent recovery has raised the question of whether some policies that
may be detrimental to employment or productivity in the long run, may nevertheless
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Figure 7. Labour market exposure and steady-state unemployment among
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Figure 8. Absolute labour market exposure and steady-state unemployment
among OECD countries
be desirable in the short run to cushion the effects of a recession. Conversely, there is
a possibility that policies which are desirable in the long run might be counter-product-
ive at a time of severe downturns, for instance by contributing to the volatility of
unemployment inflow and outflow rates.
This paper has examined the vulnerability of labour markets to adverse economic
shocks. Labour market exposure is defined as the average percentage deviation of
(steady-state) unemployment from its long-term level following an adverse shock. The
influence of labour market policies on steady-state unemployment as well as on labour
market exposure is assessed through the joint estimation of inflow and outflow rates
relationships for a panel of 19 countries covering annual data over the period 1985–
2010 to detect possible trade-offs between labour market exposure and steady-state
unemployment. The estimated effects of individual policy variables on the level and
volatility of inflow and outflow rates are, by and large, found to be consistent with job
search models such as Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) or Robin (2011).
We find that reducing the average net replacement rate of unemployment insur-
ance benefits, raising spending on active labour market policies, as well as lowering
minimum wages all lead to lower steady-state unemployment but a higher labour
market exposure. In each case, a higher proportion of low-skilled workers are
employed, but their lower productivity makes them more vulnerable to economic
downturns. Conversely, reducing the tax wedge is conducive to both lower steady-
state unemployment and lower labour market exposure. Other institutions such as
labour and product market regulations and union density have been found to have no
substantial effect on either the level or the volatility of unemployment and hence the
labour market exposure.
For some policies, the evidence provides an argument for adjusting settings accord-
ing to the state of the economy so as to reinforce the stabilizing (or offset the destabil-
izing) properties and to reduce the volatility of unemployment. In the case of the
unemployment income insurance, this could mean, for instance, temporarily raising
the replacement rate and extending the duration of benefits, as has been done in
response to the crisis in a number of countries (e.g. Canada and the United States).
This adjustment should be temporary only, as many studies have found the average
length of unemployment spells to be significantly influenced by the duration of unem-
ployment benefits through duration dependence effects, that is, where the probability
of moving from unemployment to employment diminishes with the length of the job-
less spell.18
As regards ALMPs, governments should seek to ensure that budget increases are
commensurate to the increases in caseloads during a downturn so as to avoid a
18 See Krueger and Mueller (2010) for a survey of the evidence. For example, estimates have suggested
that the combined federal-state extension of benefit in the United States from an average of 26 weeks to
99 weeks (or 90 weeks on a national average) in response to the crisis could, if maintained, raise the aver-
age length of the unemployment spell by between 0.5 to 1.2 weeks (Aaronson et al., 2010).
reduction in effective support when it is most needed. However, active labour market
programmes involve significant budgetary costs, clearly a constraint for many coun-
tries, not least those confronted with high risk of unemployment persistence. This
raises the question of the extent to which resources should be concentrated on cases
that stand better chances to find a match, which in principle would argue for focusing
on those with relatively short unemployment spells duration, despite the risk of dead-
weight loss.
Discussion
Philip Jung
University of Bonn
The role of shocks and institutions in the rise of European unemployment is a classical
topoi in macroeconomics (see Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). Traditionally, the liter-
ature has focused on explaining differences in longer-run trends in unemployment
across countries. But the recent crisis has urged the need to understand the causal
effects of different institutional settings on short-run fluctuations in labour market
turnover rates across countries as well.
The paper contributes to the literature by analysing how differences in institutions
affect both the long- as well as the short-term vulnerability of labour markets across
countries. It utilizes the cross-country variation in policy measures to jointly estimate
the effects of less generous unemployment insurance, more active labour market pol-
icy, lower minimum wages and larger tax-wedges on average labour market turnover
rates and on the persistence of these rates to adverse shocks.
For the first three policies the authors find a ‘trade-off’: these policies strengthen the
long-run labour market performance but make the countries more vulnerable to
adverse shocks. In contrast, an increase in the tax-wedge is found to weaken the long-
run performance and to increase the vulnerability to short-run shocks, suggesting a
‘win–win’ situation for a policymaker.
The paper offers a fresh view on the interaction of shocks and institution from an
empirical perspective. In my discussion I will briefly discuss the link to the theoretical
literature in the first section, will express some concerns regarding the empirical
implementation strategy in the second section and will put the findings into perspect-
ive from a normative viewpoint in the final section.
Link to theory
Some findings of the paper align well with existing theories of the labour market, oth-
ers are more challenging from a theoretical perspective because they contradict some
of the well-established channels of basic labour market search models. For example,
the authors find that an increase in the generosity of the unemployment benefit system
leads to a decline in the volatilities of the hiring rate. This result contrasts sharply with
the standard mechanism highlighted in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) that an
increase in the outside option also increases the outflow rate volatility (see the debate
involved in solving the so-called Shimer puzzle). Moreover, as shown in Jung and
Kuhn (2013) analytically, an increase in benefits would tend to increase the volatility
in the inflows as well.
The authors offer the following economic rationale for their finding: less generous
benefits increase the proportion of low-skilled workers in the employment pool, so an
adverse shock will hit this group particularly strong and makes the labour market
more vulnerable to shocks. I am somewhat sceptical that the proposed mechanism
would actually deliver the suggested increase in volatility, at least in the basic work-
horse model of the Mortensen–Pissarides type. Heterogeneity in worker types by itself
is clearly not sufficient to overturn the basic mechanism (see Jung and Kuhn, 2010).
But, as argued by the authors, standard search models do not, for example, include a
demand channel which could alter the picture considerably.
If the findings are robust, the signs of the estimated coefficients would pose a con-
siderable challenge to existing search models. But before improving the model the
question arises how reliable the empirical estimates really are. Some potential pitfalls
of the empirical estimation strategy are discussed below.
Empirical issues
The paper estimates the following stylized process for separation rates si,t (and sim-
ilarly for hiring rates) using non-linear ordinary least squares:
log si;t ¼ qi;t1ðXi;t1Þ log si;t1 þ ð1 qi;t1ðXi;t1ÞÞai
þ
X
k
bi;kInteractionðxi;t ;Zi;tÞ þ ei;t ð1Þ
where Xi,t is a vector of institutions for country i in t and Zi,t is a measure of shocks.
The authors suggest to use the persistence reflected in the autocorrelation function
qi,t1 together with the interaction terms quantified by bi as their preferred measure
for the shortrun volatility. They use the ai as a measure of the long-run level
effect.
Other than the usual critiques to reduced form regression estimates, the procedure
offered in the paper has some particular problems of its own, which I shall briefly list:
1. The methodology relies on one particular measure, the OECD output gap, as
summary of all shocks, and assumes that its autocorrelation is independent to
changes in policy institutions. Given that the output gap measure relies on a
particular filtering procedure (using information from leads) it might not be
orthogonal to changes in institutions, which makes identification using time-vari-
ation within a country a bit problematic.
2. While this problem might be minor, a more serious issue is the treatment of the
labour market turnover data. Both the hiring as well as the separation rates dis-
play, in many countries, time trends, which are possibly unrelated to institutional
changes (but, for example, might be due to ageing of the society). To study level
and cyclical affects jointly, the authors could not use an HP-filter or other detrend-
ing methods tofilter the raw turnover data. The literature instead has typically
studied differences in volatilities across countries in isolation, that is, has not
attempted to jointly estimate level and volatility effects.19 Scholars who studied
the relative importance of the ins and outs in the volatility decomposition of unem-
ployment rates have found that the variance decomposition is strongly affected by
the filtering method, see Fujita and Ramey (2009). High frequency deviations
‘that are due to mismeasurement would, in the current context, likely be captured
in the qi coefficients, but could easily be attributed to changes in institutions as
well. Similarly, I would suspect that some of the trends in the data might be cor-
related with some trends in institutional changes over time, without that a causal
relation is given. Some caution might therefore be in order when interpreting the
results.
3. The potential presence of mis-specification might be seen from the magnitudes of
the estimated regression coefficients. While theory suggests that institutional differ-
ences would show up in the bi,k coefficients, all estimated interaction terms are
insignificant. So most action for the cyclical variation is obtained from the auto-
correlation estimates instead. Here theory provides no guidance (in fact almost all
search models do not have lagged separations as a state variable, that is, qi,t1 = 0,
but would predict varying b instead). The estimator on qi as a function of institu-
tional differences might then pick up some noise in the data, or some trends,
rather than a causal change in the institution.
4. The paper focuses on in- and outflows of unemployment, but ignores flows in
and out of the labour force due to data limitations. As shown by Elsby et al.
(2013b) these flows might matter for unemployment volatility. When interpreting
their findings the authors though appeal to an argument that involves cross-
country differences in the attachment to the labour force, rather than the search
choice of the worker. Again, the signs on the volatility measures could be
affected.
5. The regression suffers from missing variable bias, in particular the matching
efficiency is likely to vary both across countries and over time (see Jung and
Kuhn, 2013), which again likely affects the results. Similarly, misspecification
19 Given the flexibility of the functional form it was unclear to me what the authors gained by estimating
the level and volatilities jointly, rather than attacking the problem separately, given that they did not use
parameter restrictions offered from search theory in the estimation.
might arise due to missing higher order control variables that lead to non-linear
effects.20
The empirical identification of causal effects from institutional differences across
country is a challenging task. Severe data limitations and measurement issues aside,
the authors progress by offering an interesting empirical perspective on some of the
cross-country correlations in labour market turnover. Yet, my discussion should have
made clear that the findings might be somewhat sensitive to the particular method
employed, so jumping to causal conclusions and policy advice might warrant further
investigation.
I will now briefly turn to a discussion of the normative implications of the paper.
A normative perspective
Based on their empirical findings the authors argue that certain labour market policies
like the generosity of the unemployment benefit system might entail a trade-off. On
the one hand, a reduction in benefits might lead to long-run gains in terms of labour
market performance measured by the unemployment rate; on the other hand, it might
lead to an amplification of shocks in downturns. In their view this suggests that policies
should be employed statecontingent, that is, unemployment benefits should be tem-
porarily increased in recessions while long-run reforms should be done in booms.
Yet, jumping to policy conclusions without a structural model that analyses the trade-
offs explicitly might be premature.
Taken their empirical finding for granted for the sake of the argument, two ques-
tions arise: first, under what conditions does a trade-off between long-run averages
and volatility really exist? The authors essentially assume that an increase in the volat-
ility is a bad thing. But this is not necessarily the case. In particular, an increase in the
volatility of separations might imply a more efficient reallocation of labour and might
be welfare enhancing, rather than welfare reducing. One channel, where an increase
in volatility actually has negative effects, is explored in Jung and Kuester (2008) and
Hairault et al. (2008). These papers show that an increase in the volatilities of the hir-
ing rate might have negative feedback effects on the long-run average turnover rates
with associated potential welfare losses. But the repercussion of an increased volatility
on the long-run means highlighted in this strand of the literature does not necessarily
imply a trade-off for any given policy reform, only a potential weakening of an other-
wise positive effect. The conclusion that delaying a, by assumption, welfare-enhancing
reform could be optimal in recessions cannot be drawn.
The second question that arises is, what should optimal state-contingent labour
market policies actually look like? That is, under what conditions should we increase
20 For example, in the Mortensen–Pissarides model, the interaction of shocks and institutions like union
density (bargaining power) is parabolic around the Hosios condition.
the generosity of the unemployment benefit system in recessions? Views differ on this
important question. For example, Landais et al. (2010) argue that unemployment bene-
fits should be increased in recessions, others highlight that one should leave unemploy-
ment benefits roughly constant and rather focus on alternative policies like hiring
subsidies and firing taxes, see Jung and Kuester (2014). Independent of the precise
policy prescription these papers share a common approach that highlights various
market frictions like moral hazard considerations or externalities that change over the
cycle and might offer scope for policy improvements. How these frictions map into
the reduced form estimates of changes in the persistence of unemployment rates
remains an open issue.
Panel discussion
Hans-Werner Sinn asked why a policymaker should be concerned with labour market
exposure in addition to the unemployment rate. Nicola Fuchs-Sch€undeln pointed out
that the labour market exposure measure appears to be capturing the size of the initial
shock and its persistence simultaneously. Would it be helpful to disentangle the two
from a welfare point of view?
Fabrice Murtin clarified that from a policy perspective it is important to consider
labour market exposure as it can hurt the government’s budget constraint. On the
joint estimation of the various equations, Murtin claimed that in contrast to the stand-
ard errors the estimates are unlikely to change. Regarding the theory, he emphasized
that the core of their explanation is based on worker heterogeneity. He informed the
panel that their story is verified by Robin’s (2011) model. However, Murtin did accept
that one could always find other theoretical models that are inconsistent with their
arguments.
Although Murtin agreed with Philip Jung that lagged unemployment flows do not
appear in any theory, he was keen to highlight that they are prevalent in the empirical
literature. Referring to the lagged hiring/outflow rate, for instance, he said that one
could think of it as a proxy for the duration of time spent in unemployment or, altern-
atively, as a means of gauging persistence effects. Further elaborating, Murtin posited
that negative duration dependence is indicative of hysteresis effects. Moving on,
Murtin thought that adopting a three-state model for verification purposes would be a
good idea. Conversely, he was not convinced by Jung’s flows volatility measure pre-
cisely because, as the discussant mentioned, it depends on HP filtering. Specifically,
he was sceptical about what HP filtering really does – whether it eliminates structural
effects or parts of the cycle which may be persistent in some countries. Lastly, with
respect to welfare, Murtin stated that the persistence of unemployment (particularly
long unemployment spells) is the key driver of unhappiness. He contended that this is
why the flexicurity system, characterized by strong outflow rates, is particularly bene-
ficial for welfare.
APPENDIX
ESTIMATION RESULTS
Our analysis not only examines the channels through which labour market policies
and institutions have an effect (inflow versus outflow), but also reflects on the type of
effects at play. We retain three types of effects: Labour market policies having an effect
on the steady-state levels of inflow and outflow rates (labelled as the ‘level’ effect), on
their degree of time persistence (the ‘persistence’ effect) and on the sensitivity to busi-
ness cycle shocks (the ‘sensitivity’ effect transiting through the elasticity of the output
gap). In practice, we estimate the following system where X stands for policy and insti-
tutional variables and Z for the output gap:
log si;t ¼ qsi;t|{z}
persistence
log si;t1 þ 1 qsi;t
 
asi þ kst þ
X
j
bsj X
j
i;t|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
level
0
BBBB@
1
CCCCAþ /s0 þ
X
k
/skðXki;tÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
sensitivity
0
BBBB@
1
CCCCAZi;t þ esi;t
qsi;t ¼ qs0 þ
P
k
qskðXki;tÞ
log fi;t ¼ qfi;t log fi;t1 þ 1 qfi;t
 
afi þ kft þ
P
j
bfj X
j
i;t
!
þ /f0 þ
P
k
/fk ðXki;tÞ
 
Zi;t þ efi;t
qfi;t ¼ qf0 þ
P
k
qfk ðXki;tÞ
Zi;t ¼ qZ0 Zi;t1 þ eZi;t
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The results from estimating this econometric system via non-linear ordinary least
squares are reported in Table A1.
Table A1. Policy and institutional effects through various channels, 1985–2010
Dependent
variable:
log s log f
Channel:
level gap lag level gap lag
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial net
replacement
rate
0.323 0.001 0.019 2.074* 0.011* 0.021
(0.771) (0.005) (0.020) (1.175) (0.006) (0.037)
Average benefits
duration
0.447 0.002 0.058*** 1.016 0.002 0.022
(0.901) (0.004) (0.016) (1.165) (0.004) (0.029)
EPL regular 0.145 0.008* 0.115*** 0.205 0.000 0.005
(0.168) (0.004) (0.038) (0.198) (0.005) (0.033)
Active ALMP
normalised
0.026 0.006 0.024 1.496** 0.016** 0.024
(0.634) (0.006) (0.041) (0.701) (0.007) (0.036)
Tax wedge 0.023* 0.009 0.306*** 0.024 0.007 0.157***
(0.012) (0.005) (0.045) (0.015) (0.006) (0.038)
DATA SOURCES
Unemployment, labour force, inflow and outflow rates
• Unemployment rate: Unemployed workers as a share of the labour force, in
%. Aggregate rates refer to the 15–64 age group. Source: OECD Database on
Labour Force Statistics; OECD, Annual Labour Force Statistics.
• Unemployment inflow rate: The pace at which workers become unemployed.
Source: OECD Unemployment Distribution Database.
• Unemployment outflow rate: The pace at which unemployed workers leave
unemployment. Source: OECD Unemployment Distribution Database.
Policy and institutional indicators
• Net initial replacement rate: average unemployment benefit replacement rate
during the first year of unemployment across two income situations (100% and
67% of APW earnings) and three family situations (single, with dependent spouse,
with spouse in work). Source: OECD, Benefits and Wages Database
• Average replacement rate: average unemployment benefit replacement rate
across two income situations (100% and 67% of APW earnings), three family situ-
ations (single, with dependent spouse, with spouse in work) and three different
unemployment durations (1st year, 2nd and 3rd years, and 4th and 5th years of
unemployment). Source: OECD, Benefits and Wages Database.
Table A1. (Continued)
Dependent
variable:
log s log f
Channel:
level gap lag level gap lag
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Minimum
wage
3.136*** 0.011** 0.043 0.363 0.003 0.007
(1.149) (0.005) (0.031) (1.651) (0.006) (0.034)
No minimum
wage
0.144 0.010** 0.145*** 0.185 0.023*** 0.121***
(0.137) (0.005) (0.027) (0.300) (0.006) (0.033)
Union density 0.014 0.002 0.077* 0.010 0.004 0.031
(0.011) (0.006) (0.042) (0.013) (0.007) (0.043)
PMR 0.048 0.001 0.015 0.127* 0.011** 0.084***
(0.059) (0.004) (0.010) (0.076) (0.005) (0.028)
Output gap 0.011*** 0.033***
(0.004) (0.006)
Lagged dependent
variable
0.715*** 0.718***
(0.038) (0.038)
Time effects Yes Yes
Country
fixed-effects
Yes Yes
R2 0.96 0.97
N 368 368
• Average benefits duration: ratio of average to initial unemployment benefit
replacement rate (see above). Source: OECD, Benefits and Wages Database.
• Tax wedge: Tax wedge between the labour cost to the employer and the corre-
sponding net take-home pay of the employee.
Tax wedge ¼ 1 ð1 TYH :RÞ  ð1 SSC :RÞ  ðPGDP=PCPÞ
1 ð1 TYH=ðWSSS  SSC þ YOTHÞÞ
 ð1 SSC=WSSÞ  ðPGDP=PCPÞ
where: TYH: Direct taxes on household income; WSSS: Compensation of employees;
SSC: Social Security Contributions (excluding self-employed); YOTH: Net self-employ-
ment and property income received by households; PGDP: GDP price deflator; PCP:
Private consumption price deflator. Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, No 87, May 2010
and Revenue Statistics, 2010.
• PES and administration, employment incentives and training mea-
sures: Public expenditure in labour market programmes per unemployed person
divided by GDP per capita adjusted for cyclical fluctuations using a HP filter.
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook 2010.
• Employment protection for regular contracts: OECD summary indicator
of the stringency of employment protection legislation for regular or temporary
workers. Source: Venn (2009).
• Product market regulation (PMR): OECD summary indicator of regulatory
impediments to product market competition in seven non-manufacturing indus-
tries. Source: W€olfl et al. (2009),
• Union density: Trade union density rate, i.e. the share of workers affiliated to a
trade union, in %. Source: OECD, Employment Outlook 2010.
• Minimum wage: Ratio of minimum wage to median wage. Source: Employment
Labour and Social Affairs Directorate Database and National sources.
Other variables
• Output gap: OECD measure of the gap between actual and potential output as
a percentage of potential output. Source: OECD Economic Outlook, No. 87, May
2010.
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